Abstract. We introduce a new combinatorial primitive called programmable hash functions (PHFs). PHFs can be used to program the output of a hash function such that it contains solved or unsolved discrete logarithm instances with a certain probability. This is a technique originally used for security proofs in the random oracle model. We give a variety of standard model realizations of PHFs (with different parameters).
Introduction

Programmable Hash Functions
A group hash function is an efficiently computable function that maps binary strings into a group G. We propose the concept of a programmable hash function which is a keyed group hash function that can behave in two indistinguishable ways, depending on how the key is generated. If the standard key generation algorithm is used, then the hash function fulfills its normal functionality, i.e., it properly hashes its inputs into a group G. The alternative (trapdoor) key generation algorithm outputs a key that is indistinguishable from the one output by the standard algorithm. It furthermore generates some additional secret trapdoor information that depends on two (user-specified) generators g and h from the group. This trapdoor information makes it possible to relate the output of the hash function H to g and h: for any input X, one obtains integers a X and b X such that the relation
holds. For the PHF to be (m, n)-programmable we require that for all choices of X 1 , . . . , X m and Z 1 , . . . , Z n such that for all i, j it is true that X i = Z j , it holds that a X i = 0 but a Z j = 0, with significant probability:
Hence parameter m controls the number of elements X for which we can hope to have H(X) = h b X ; parameter n controls the number of elements Z for which we can hope to have H(Z) = g a Z h b Z for some a Z = 0. The concept becomes useful in groups with hard discrete logarithms and when the trapdoor key generation algorithm does not know the discrete logarithm of h to the basis g. It is then possible to program the hash function such that the hash images of all possible choices X 1 , . . . , X m of m inputs do not depend on g (since a X = 0). At the same time the hash images of all possible choices Z 1 , . . . , Z n of n (different) inputs do depend on g in a known way (since a Z = 0).
Intuitively, this resembles a scenario we are often confronted with in "provable security": for some of the hash outputs we know the discrete logarithm, and for some we do not. This situation appears naturally during a reduction that involves an adaptive adversary. Concretely, knowledge of the discrete logarithms of some hash queries can be used to simulate, e.g., a signing oracle for an adversary (which would normally require knowledge of a secret signing key). On the other hand, once the adversary produces, e.g., a signature on its own, our hope is that this signature corresponds to a hash query for which the we do not know the discrete logarithm. This way, the adversary has produced a piece of nontrivial secret information which can be used to break an underlying computational assumption.
This way of "programming" a hash function is very popular in the context of random oracles [5] (which, in a sense, are ideally programmable hash functions), and has been used to derive proofs of the adaptive security of cryptosystems [6, 12, 14] .
An (m, poly)-PHF is an (m, n)-PHF for all polynomials n. A (poly, m)-PHF is defined the same way. Note that, using this notation, a random oracle implies a (poly, 1)-PHF.
Instantiations As our central instantiation of a PHF we use the following function which was originally introduced by Chaum et al. [23] as a collision-resistant hash function. The "multi-generator" hash function H MG : {0, 1} → G is defined as H MG (X) :=
, where the h i are public generators of the group and X = (X 1 , . . . , X ). After its discovery in [23] it was also used in other constructions (e.g., [7, 19, 24, 65] ), relying on other useful properties beyond collision resistance. Specifically, in the analysis of his identity-based encryption scheme, Waters [65] implicitly proved that, using our notation, H MG is a (1, poly)-programmable hash function. Our main result concerning instantiations of PHFs is a new analysis of H MG showing that it is also a (2, 1)-PHF. Furthermore, we can use our new techniques to prove better bounds on the (1, poly)-programmability of H MG . Our analysis uses random-walk techniques and is different from the one implicitly given in [65] .
Variations The concept of PHFs can be extended to randomized programmable hash functions (RPHFs). A RPHF is like a PHF whose input takes an additional parameter, the randomness. Our main constructions of a randomized hash functions are RH F and RH L . They are both (1, 1)-programmable and have short parameters. In some applications (e.g., for RSA signatures) we need a special type a PHF which we call bounded PHF. Essentially, for bounded PHFs we need to know a certain upper bound on the |a X | from (1) , for all X.
Applications Collision Resistant Hashing
We aim to use PHFs as a tool to provide black-box proofs for various cryptographic protocols. As a toy example let us sketch why, in prime-order groups with hard discrete logarithms, any (1, 1)-PHF implies collision-resistant hashing. Setting up H using the trapdoor generation algorithm will remain unnoticed for an adversary, but any collision H(X) = H(Z) with X = Z gives rise to an equation g a X h b X = H(X) = H(Z) = g a Z h b Z with known exponents. Since the hash function is (1, 1)-programmable we have, with non-negligible probability, a X = 0 and a Z = 0 (so in particular a X = a Z ). This implies h = g a Z /(b X −b Z ) , revealing the discrete logarithm of h to the base g. (Note that already the weaker condition a X = a Z is sufficient to imply collision resistance.)
Generic Bilinear Map Signatures
We propose the following generic Bilinear Maps signature scheme with respect to a group hash function H. The signature of a message X is defined as the tuple
where s is interpreted as a random η-bit integer, and x ∈ Z |G| is the secret key. The signature can be verified with the help of the public key g, g x and a bilinear map. This signature scheme can be seen as a generalization (resp. variation) of the schemes from [11, 21, 57] . Our main theorem concerning the Bilinear Map signatures states that if, for some m ≥ 1, H is an (m, 1)-programmable hash function and the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption [11] holds, then the above signature scheme is unforgeable against chosen-message attacks [39] . Here, the parameter m controls the size η = η(m) of the randomness s. For "80-bit security" and assuming the scheme establishes no more than q = 2 30 signatures [6] , we can choose η = 30 + 80/m such that η = 70 is sufficient when using our (2, 1)-PHF H MG . The total signature size amounts to 160 + 70 = 230 bits. (See below for details.)
Generic RSA Signatures We propose the following generic RSA signature scheme with respect to a group hash function H. The signature of a message X is defined as the tuple
1/e , e ∈ Z N × {0, 1} η ,
where e is a η bit prime. The eth root can be computed using the factorization of N = pq which is contained in the secret key. Our main theorem concerning RSA signatures states that if, for some m ≥ 1, H is an (m, 1)-programmable hash function and the strong RSA assumption holds, then the above signature scheme is unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. Again, the parameter m controls the size of the prime as η ≈ 30 + 80/m. Furthermore, our generic constructions explain signature schemes by Okamoto [57] , Fischlin [33] , variants of Zhu [66, 67] and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [21] , and shed light why other proposals are not secure.
Other Applications BLS signatures [15] are an example of "full-domain hash" (FDH) signature schemes [5] . Using the properties of a (m, 1)-programmable hash function one can give a black-box reduction from m-time unforgeability of SIG BLS to breaking the CDH assumption. The same reduction also holds for all full-domain hash signatures, for example also RSA-FDH. Consequently, with a (poly, 1) PHF we obtain full unforgeability of full-domain signature schemes. Similarly, the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [13] can be proved secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption when instantiated with a (poly, 1)-PHF. Unfortunately, we do not know of any standard-model instantiation of (poly, 1)-PHFs. This fact may be not too surprising given the impossibility results from [30] . 1 It is furthermore possible to reduce the security of Waters' IBE and signature scheme [65] to breaking the CDH assumption, when instantiated with a (1, poly)-programmable hash function. This explains Waters' specific analysis in our PHF framework. Furthermore, our improved bound on the (1, poly)-programmability of H MG gives a (slightly) tighter security reduction for Waters' IBE and signature scheme.
A Conceptual Perspective
We would like underline the importance of programmable hash functions as a concept for designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols in the Diffie-Hellman and RSA setting. The central idea is that one can partition the output of a hash function into two types of instances (cf. (1) and (2)) that can be treated differently by a security reduction. This is reminiscent to what proofs in the random oracle model usually do (e.g., [6, 12, 14] ) and hence PHFs offer a simple and abstract framework for designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols without explicitly relying on random oracles. More importantly, a large body of cryptographic protocols with security in the standard model are using-implicitly or explicitly-the partitioning trick that is formalized in PRFs. To mention only a few examples, this ranges from collision-resistant hashing [7, 23] , digital signature schemes [11, 65] (also in various flavors [8, 46, 57, 61] ), chosen-ciphertext secure encryption [17, 18, 43, 44, 49] , identity-based encryption [2, 9, 10, 22, 51] to symmetric authentication [53] . In fact, besides a number of specific proofs, there seem to be only two generic techniques known to prove (Diffie-Hellman and RSA-based) cryptographic protocols in the standard model: the partitioning trick as abstracted in programmable hash functions and the recent dual system approach by Waters [64] .
Short Signatures
Our main new applications of PHFs are short signatures in the standard model. We now discuss our results in more detail. We refer to [11, 15] 
, where e is a random η-bit prime and r is a random bit mask. The birthday paradox (for uniformly sampled primes) tells us that after establishing q distinct Fischlin signatures, the probability that there exist two signatures, (e, r 1 , y 1 ) on m 1 and (e, r 2 , y 2 ) on m 2 , with the same prime e is roughly q 2 η/2 η . One can verify that in case of such a collision, (e, 2r 1 − r 2 , 2y 1 − y 2 ) is a valid signature on the "message" 2m 1 − m 2 (with constant probability). Hence, from two Fischlin signatures w.r.t. the same randomness e a signature can be computed (and hence the scheme can be broken). Usually, for "k bit security" one requires the adversary's success ratio (i.e., the forging probability of an adversary divided by its running time) to be upper bounded by 2 −k . For k = 80 and assuming the number of signature queries is upper bounded by q = 2 30 , the length of the prime must therefore be at least η > 80 + 60 + 8 = 148 bits to immunize against this birthday attack. We remark that for a different reason, Fischlin' signatures even require η ≥ 160 bits.
Beyond the Birthday Paradox
In fact, Fischlin's signature scheme can be seen as our generic RSA signatures scheme from (4), instantiated with a concrete (randomized) (1, 1)-PHF (RH F ). In our notation, the programmability of the hash function is used at the point where an adversary uses a given signature (e, y 1 ) to create a forgery (e, y) with the same prime e. A simulator in the security reduction has to be able to compute y 1 = H(X) 1/e but must use y = H(Z) 1/e to break the strong RSA challenge, i.e., to compute g 1/e and e > 1 from g. However, since the hash function is (1, 1)-programmable we can program H with g and h = g e such that, with some non-negligible probability, H(X) 1/e = h b X /e = g b X can be computed but H(Z) 1/e = (g a Z h b Z ) 1/e = g a Z /e g b Z can be used to break the strong RSA assumption since a Z = 0.
Our central improvement consists of instantiating the generic RSA signature scheme with an (m, 1)-PHF to break the birthday bound. The observation is that such hash functions can guarantee that after establishing up to m signatures with respect to the same prime, forging is still impossible. In analogy to the above, with an (m, 1)-PHF the simulation is successful as long as there are at most m many signatures that use the same prime as in the forgery. By the generalized birthday paradox we know that after establishing q distinct generic RSA signatures the probability that there exists m signatures with the same prime is roughly q m+1 ( η 2 η ) m . Again, the success ratio has to be bounded by 2 −80 for q = 2 30 which means that SIG RSA [H] instantiated with a (2, 1)-PRF can have primes as small as η = 80 bits to be provably secure. 2 The security proof for the bilinear map scheme SIG BM [H] is similar. Due to the extended birthday Table 1 . Recommended signature sizes of different schemes. The parameters are chosen to provide unforgeability with k = 80 bits security after revealing maximal q = 2 30 signatures. RSA signatures are instantiated with a modulus of |N | = 1024 bits, bilinear maps signatures in asymmetric pairings with |G| = log p = 160 bits. We assume without loss of generality that messages are of size bits (otherwise, we can apply a collision-resistant hash function first), where must be in the order of 2k = 160 in order to provide k bits of security. The efficiency column counts the dominant operations for signing. For Bilinear signatures this counts the number of exponentiations, for RSA signatures k × P η counts the number of random η-bit primes that need to be generated. We remark that the Hohenberger-Waters scheme relies only on the (non-strong) RSA assumption but its computational cost is incomparably higher. [33] ; instantiated with the RPHF RH L it explains a variant of the schemes by Zhu [66, 67] 3 and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [21] . (Concretely, our variant uses a modified randomness space, see Appendix B for details.) In our comparison, we have also included the recent scheme of Hohenberger and Waters [45] . Their scheme has the benefit of relying only on the (non-strong) RSA assumption and having
for public h 1 , h 2 , x. In this, e is a 160-bit prime, and α ∈ {0, 1} 160 is uniform. The remark in [33, Sect. 2.3] suggests to instead use a signature (e, α, y) with y e = xh α 1 h
This has the advantage that e and α can be chosen of size around 80 bits. It is claimed that the security proof of the original scheme can be adapted to this variant. However, the proof crucially uses that there is no collision among the e values used during the signing process, i.e., that no e occurs in more than one simulated signature. With 160-bit primes e, such a collision will occur only with small probability; but with 80-bit primes e, the probability will be in the order of 1/2 40 . 3 The security proof given in [67] does not seem to be correct. Concretely, Zhu's signatures are of the form (e, α, y) and satisfy y e = h 0 h α 1 h
for public h 0 , h 1 , h 2 . In this, e is a random 2k-bit prime, and α ∈ {0, 1} is uniform. However, in the security proof of a Type I adversary (for which e = e j ∈ {e 1 , . . . , e q }), one needs to argue that the simulated randomness α j is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} . However, a close inspection of the used random variables shows that this is not the case (given the view of the adversary). Our variant SIG RSA [RH L ], as well as the scheme by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [21] use larger randomness space to make the simulation work. a compact verification key. However, their scheme requires a large number of primality tests and exponentiations during signing and verifying.
The main advantage of our bilinear maps scheme SIG BM [H MG ] is its very compact signatures of only 230 bits. This saves 90 bits compared to the short signatures scheme from Boneh-Boyen [11] and is only 70 bits larger than the random oracle BLS signatures. The signature scheme SIG BM [RH L ] is exactly the one proposed by Okamoto [57] (which was implicitly introduced in a group signature scheme [35] ).
An obvious drawback of our constructions is the size of the public verification key since it includes the group hash key K. For example, for H MG : {0, 1} → G, K contains + 1 group elements, where = 160. In the bilinear case, that makes a verification key of 26k bits to be compared with 160 bits from [11] . While these short signatures are mostly of theoretical interest and contribute to the problem of determining concrete bounds on the size of standard-model signatures, we think that in certain applications even a large public key is tolerable. In particular, our public-key sizes are still comparable to the ones of recently proposed lattice-based signatures [17, 22, 38, 54] . Furthermore, even for signatures in the random oracle model, sometimes a relatively large verification key is necessary [31] .
We remark that our concrete security reductions for the two generic schemes are not tight, i.e., the reductions roughly lose log(q/δ) bits of security (cf. Theorems 10 and 13). Strictly speaking, a non-tight reduction has to be penalized by having to choose a larger group order. Even though this is usually not done in the literature [28, 33] , we also consider concrete signature size when additionally taking the non-tight security reduction into account. A rigorous comparison will be done in Sect. 7.
Related Signature Schemes Our generic bilinear map signature scheme belongs to the class of "inversion-based" signature schemes originally proposed in [59] and first formally analyzed in [11] . The signature scheme from [57] can be viewed as a special case of our generic bilinear map signature scheme instantiated with a randomized PHF.
Other related standard-model schemes can be found in [16, 37] . We stress that our signatures derive from the above since the message does not appear in the denominator of the exponent. Our generic RSA signature scheme builds on the early work by Cramer and Shoup [28] . The signature schemes from [33] and variants of [21, 66, 67] can be viewed as a special case of our generic bilinear map signature scheme instantiated with a randomized PHF. Other standard-model RSA schemes are [20, 26, 29, 36, 40, 48, 56, 60] . We remark that security proofs for strong RSA-based signature schemes are quite subtle and several variants proposed in the literature contain flawed security proofs. As already explained in Footnote 2, a variant by Fischlin [33, Sect. 2.3 ] cannot be proved secure. Furthermore, the proof of a scheme proposed by Zhu [66, 67] turned out to be incorrect (see Footnote 3) but a close variant with slightly larger randomness space (i.e., {0, 1} L with L = + k instead of L = ) can be proved secure using our framework.
Dedicated vs. Programmable Hash Functions
As argued before, random oracles [5] can be viewed as excellent programmable hash functions. For common applications such as full-domain hash signatures or OAEP, one usually instantiates the random oracle with a fixed, dedicated hash function (such as SHA1 [62] ), Therefore, one may ask the question if such concrete hash functions (when used as keyed hash functions) can serve as good programmable hash functions. More concretely, is SHA1 an (m, n)-PRF for parameters m, n ≥ 1?
Even though it seems hard to actually disprove, our intuition says that this is very likely not the case. In fact, one of the key design maxims of hash functions like SHA1 is to destroy all algebraic structure. In contrast, the definition of programmable hash functions requires that there is a relation over an algebraic structure. (I.e., we require that H(X) = g a X h b X over the group G.) In that sense programmable hash functions formalize an obvious weakness in the random oracle methodology: security proofs making in the random oracle model often use a property of the hash function that is commonly avoided by hash function's designers. Therefore, we do not recommend to use dedicated hash functions as a PHF.
Open Problems
We show that PHFs provide a useful primitive to obtain black-box proofs for certain signature schemes. We leave it for future research to extend the application of PHFs to other types of protocols. Another interesting direction is to find instantiations of PHFs from different assumptions. For instance, the ideas in [2, 17, 22] seem conceptually close to programmable hash functions in lattices.
We leave it as an open problem to prove or disprove the standard-model existence of (poly, 1)-PHFs. (Note that a positive result would imply a security proof for FDH signatures like [6, 15] .) Moreover, we are asking for a concrete construction of a bounded (m, 1)-PHF for m > 2. 4 For example, a (3, 1)-PHF could be used to shrink the signature size of SIG BM [H] to ≈ 215 bits; a bounded (5, 1)-PHF would make it possible to shrink the size of the prime in SIG RSA [H] to roughly η = 60 bits and make signing roughly as efficient as RSA full-domain hash 5 (with the drawback of a larger public key). Finally, a (2, 1) or (1, poly)-PHF with more compact parameters would have dramatic impact on the practicability of our signature schemes or Waters' IBE scheme [65] .
Preliminaries
Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size.
If k ∈ N then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. For n ∈ N, we write 4 We remark that an earlier version of this paper contained a generalization of RH F to a randomized (m, 1)-PHF for any m ≥ 2. However, for our applications it did not turn out to be useful. Since for m ≥ 2 it is not sufficiently bounded (it is only 2 m -bounded), it does not lead to more efficient RSA-based signatures. In the bilinear case, the instantiations with this RPHF are all less efficient than Boneh-Boyen signatures. 5 For η ≈ 60 a full exponentiation modulo a 1024-bit integer become roughly as expensive as finding a random η-bit prime.
Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme SIG consists of three PPT algorithms. The key generation algorithm inputs a security parameter (in unary representation) and generates a secret signing and a public verification key. The signing algorithm inputs the signing key and a message and returns a signature. The deterministic verification algorithm inputs the verification key and returns accept or reject. We demand the usual correctness property. We recall the definition for unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA), played between a challenger and a forger F :
1. On input of the security parameter k, the challenger generates verification/signing key, and gives the verification key to F ; 2. F makes a number of signing queries to the challenger; each such query is a message m i ; the challenger signs m i , and sends the result sig i to F ; 3. F outputs a message m and a signature sig.
We say that forger F wins the game if sig is a valid signature on m and it has not queried a signature on m before. Forger F (t, q, )-breaks the UF-CMA security of SIG if its running time is bounded by t, it makes at most q signing queries, and the probability that it wins the above game is bounded by . Finally, SIG is UF-CMA secure if no forger can (t, q, )-break the UF-CMA security of SIG for polynomial t and q and non-negligible (in the security parameter k).
Pairing Groups and the q-SDH Assumption
Our pairing schemes will be defined on families of bilinear groups
) consist of a multiplicative cyclic group G of prime order p, where 2 k < p < 2 k+1 , a multiplicative cyclic group G T of the same order, a generator g ∈ G, and a non-degenerate bilinear pairingê: G × G → G T . See [11] for a description of the properties of such pairings. We say an adversary A (t, )-breaks the q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption if its running time is bounded by t and Pr s, g
where g is a uniform generator of G and x $ ← Z * p . We require that in PG the q-SDH [11] assumption holds meaning that no adversary can (t, ) break the q-SDH problem for a polynomial t and non-negligible .
RSA Groups and the Strong RSA Assumption
Our RSA schemes will be defined on families of RSA groups (RG k ) k∈N . A safe RSA group RG = RG k = (P , Q) consists of two distinct safe primes P and Q of k/2 bits. (A safe prime is a prime number of the form 2P + 1, where P is also a prime.) In our later constructions, we will also use QR N , the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo an RSA number N = pq.
We say an adversary A (t, )-breaks the strong RSA assumption if its running time is bounded by t and
We require that in RG the strong RSA assumption [3, 34] holds meaning that no adversary can (t, )-break the strong RSA problem for a polynomial t and nonnegligible .
Programmable Hash Functions
Definitions
A group family G = (G k ) is a family of cyclic groups G k , indexed by the security parameter k ∈ N. When the reference to the security parameter k is clear, we will simply write G instead of G k . A group hash function H = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) for a group family G = (G k ) and with input length = (k) consists of two PPT algorithms. For security parameter k ∈ N, a key K $ ← PHF.Gen(1 k ) is generated by the key generation algorithm PHF.Gen. This key K can then be used for the deterministic evaluation algorithm PHF.Eval to evaluate H via y ← PHF.Eval(K, X) ∈ G for any X ∈ {0, 1} . We write H K (X) = PHF.Eval(K, X).
Definition 1. A group hash function H is an (m, n, γ, δ)-programmable hash function
if there are PPT algorithms PHF.TrapGen (the trapdoor key generation algorithm) and PHF.TrapEval (the deterministic trapdoor evaluation algorithm) such that the following holds:
produces a key K along with a trapdoor t. Moreover, (a X , b X )←PHF.TrapEval(t, X) produces integers a X and b X for any X ∈ {0, 1} .
, for all X ∈ {0, 1} and the corresponding (a X , b X ) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, X).
Statistically close trapdoor keys: For all generators g, h ∈ G and for
, the keys K and K are statistically γ -close:
For all generators g, h ∈ G and all possible K in the range of (the first component of)
where the probability is over the trapdoor t that was produced along with K .
We simply say that H is an (m, n)-programmable hash function if there is a negligible γ and a noticeable δ such that H is (m, n, γ, δ)-programmable. Furthermore, we call H (poly, n)-programmable if H is (q, n)-programmable for every polynomial q = q(k).
We say that H is (m, poly)-programmable (resp. (poly, poly)-programmable) if the obvious holds.
We remark that the requirement of the statistically close trapdoor keys is somewhat reminiscent to the concept of "lossy trapdoor functions" [58] . Note that a group hash function can be a (m, n)-programmable hash function for different parameters m, n with different trapdoor key generation and trapdoor evaluation algorithms. In our RSA application, the following additional definition will prove useful: [27] : the random oracle on some input X is defined to be as
Then (5) is fulfilled with probability
We will now give an example of a programmable hash function in the standard model. 
computes and returns
Essentially this function was already used, with an objective similar to ours in mind, in a construction from [65] . Here we provide a new use case and a useful abstraction of this function; also, we shed light on the properties of this function from different angles (i.e., for different values of m and n). In [65] , it was implicitly proved that H MG is a (1, poly)-PHF: 
It is clear that this fulfills the syntactic and correctness requirements of Definition 1. Also, since the b i are chosen independently and uniformly, so are the h i , and the trapdoor keys indistinguishability requirement follows. It is more challenging to prove (5) (for m = 2, n = 1), i.e., that for all strings X 1 , X 2 and Z 1 ∈ {X 1 , X 2 }, we have
We will only give an intuition here. First, note that the X 1 , X 2 , Z 1 are independent of the a i , since they are masked by the
where we define i ∈ X 1 iff the ith component x 1i of X 1 is 1), then the value
essentially 7 constitutes a random walk of length |X 1 | + 1 ≤ + 1. Theory says that it is likely that this random walk ends up with an a X 1 of small absolute value. That is, for any d with |d| = O( √ ), the probability that
In particular, the probability for a X 1 = 0 is Θ(1/ √ ). Now if X 1 and X 2 were disjoint and there was no a 0 in the sum, then a X 1 and a X 2 would be independent and we would get a X 1 = a X 2 = 0 with probability Θ(1/ ). But even if X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅, and taking into account a 0 , we can conclude similarly by lower bounding the probability that a
The additional requirement from (6) that a Z 1 = 0 is intuitively much more obvious, but also much harder to formally prove. First, without loss of generality, we can assume that Z 1 ⊆ X 1 ∪ X 2 , since otherwise, there is a "partial random walk" a Z 1 \(X 1 ∪X 2 ) that contributes to a Z 1 but is independent of a X 1 and a X 2 . Hence, even when already assuming a X 1 = a X 2 = 0, a Z 1 still is sufficiently randomized to take a non-zero value with constant probability. Also, we can assume Z 1 not to "split" X 1 in the sense that Z 1 ∩ X 1 ∈ {∅, X 1 } (similarly for X 2 ). Otherwise, even assuming a fixed value of a X 1 , there is still some uncertainty about a Z 1 ∩X 1 and hence about a Z 1 (in which case with some probability, a Z 1 does not equal any fixed value). The remaining cases can be handled with a similar "no-splitting" argument. However, note that the fixed "a 0 = −1" in the g-exponent of h 0 is essential: without it, picking X 1 and X 2 disjoint and setting
A full proof is given in Appendix A.1. 6 If |G| is not known, this may only be possible approximately. 7 Usually, random walks are formalized as a sum of independent values a i ∈ {−1, 1}; for us, it is more convenient to assume a i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. However, this does not change things significantly.
Using techniques from the proof of Theorem 5, we can asymptotically improve the bounds from Theorem 4 as follows (a proof can be found in Appendix A): If the group order G is not known (as will be the case in our upcoming RSA-based signature scheme), then it may not even be possible to sample group exponents uniformly. However, for the special case where G = QR N is the group of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and q, we can approximate a uniform exponent with a random element from Z N 2 . (See, e.g., [28] .) In this case, the statistical distance between keys produced by PHF.Gen and those produced by PHF.TrapGen is smaller than ( + 1)/N . We get the following theorem.
Theorem 8. For the group G = QR N of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and q, the function
As is to be expected, one can show that also in case G = QR N , the function H MG is not (3, 1)-programmable.
Randomized Programmable Hash Functions (RPHFs)
In Appendix B we further generalize the notion of PHFs to randomized programmable hash functions (RPHFs). Briefly, RPHFs are PHFs whose evaluation is randomized, and where this randomness is added to the image (so that verification is possible). We show how to adapt the PHF definition to the randomized case, in a way suitable for the upcoming applications. We also give instantiations of RPHFs for parameters for which we do not know how to instantiate PHFs.
Basic Applications of PHFs
Collision-Resistant Hashing
As a warm-up, we can show the natural result that any (non-trivially) programmable hash function is collision resistant.
Theorem 9.
Assume |G| is known and prime, and the discrete logarithm problem in G is hard. Let H be a (1, 1) (1 k , g, h) , for any g, h. Any collision H K (X) = H K (X ) with X = X gives rise to an equation
where (a, b) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, X) and (a , b ) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, X ). (5) states that with non-negligible probability, we have a = 0 and a = 0, in which case we can com-
Similarly (using Lemma 14) , one can show that for a PHF for G = QR N , (1, 1)-programmability implies collision resistance under the strong RSA assumption. We omit the details.
Other Applications
As already discussed in the introduction, PHFs have other applications. IBE and signature scheme [65] . In fact, the (1, poly)-PHF H MG is the original hash function Waters used in his IBE scheme. Our new bound from Theorem 6 can be used to improve the bound in the security reduction of Waters' IBE and signature scheme. We expect that the same improvements can be achieved for schemes based on Waters' IBE, e.g., [1, 4, 18, 50, 52] .
Generic Signatures from Bilinear Maps
Construction
be a pairing group. Let n = n(k) and η = η(k) be two arbitrary polynomials. Our signature scheme signs messages m ∈ {0, 1} n using randomness s ∈ {0, 1} η . 8 Let a group hash function H = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) with inputs from {0, 1} n and outputs from G be given. We are ready to define our generic bilinear map signature scheme SIG BM [H]. 
Key-Generation
We remark that the scheme can also be instantiated in asymmetric pairing groups where the pairing is given byê : G 1 ×G 2 → G T and G 1 = G 2 . We use MNT curves [55] such that the element y ∈ G 1 from the signature can be represented in 160 bits. (See [11] for more details.) Also, in asymmetric pairings, verification can equivalently check ifê(y,
). This way we avoid any expensive exponentiation in G 2 and verification time becomes roughly the same as in the Boneh-Boyen short signatures [11] . It can be verified that the following proof also holds in asymmetric pairing groups. (Note that the security assumption also has to be adapted to symmetric q-SDH assumption which is given
it is hard to find a pair (c, g
).) An efficiency comparison of the scheme instantiated with the (2, 1)-PHF H MG from Definition 3 is done in Sect. 7.
Proof of Theorem 10
Let F be the adversary against the signature scheme. Throughout this proof, we assume that H is a (m, 1, γ, δ) -programmable hash function. Furthermore, we fix some notation. Let m i be the ith query to the signing oracle and (s i , y i ) denote the answer. Let m and (s, y) be the forgery output by the adversary. We introduce two types of forgers:
Type I: It always holds that s = s i for some i. Type II: It always holds that s = s i for all i.
By F 1 (resp., F 2 ) we denote the forger who runs F but then only outputs the forgery if it is of type I (resp., type II). We now show that both types of forgers can be reduced to the (q + 1)-SDH problem. Theorem 10 then follows by a standard hybrid argument.
Both reductions rely on a trick from [11] 
To prove the lemma we proceed in games. In the following, X i denotes the probability for the adversary to successfully forge a signature in Game i. 
Game 2. Now we select the random values s i used for answering signing queries not upon each signing query, but at the beginning of the experiment. Since the s i were selected independently anyway, this change is only conceptual. Let E = q i=1 {s i } be the set of all s i , and let E i = E \ {s i }. We also change the selection of the elements g, h used during (K , t) $ ← PHF. TrapGen(1 k , g, h) as follows. First, we uniformly choose i * ∈ [q] and a generatorg ∈ G. Define E * = E \ {s i * } and E * ,i = E * \ {s i }. Further, define the polynomials p * (η) = t∈E * (η + t) and p(η) = t∈E (η + t) and note that deg(p * ) ≤ q − 1 and deg(p) ≤ q. Hence the values g =g p * (x) , h =g p(x) , and X = g x =g xp * (x) can be computed fromg,g x , . . . ,g x q . Here the index x ∈ Z * |G| is the secret key of the scheme. We then set
Note that we can compute (x + s i )th roots for i = i * from g and for all i from h. Unless we are in the unlucky case that g or h are not generators (which can only happens if p(x) = 0) this change is purely conceptual:
Observe also that i * is independent of the adversary's view.
Game 3.
In this game, we change the way signature requests from the adversary are answered. First, observe that the way we modified the generation of g and h in Game 2 implies that for any i with s i = s i * , we have (10) for (a m i , b m i ) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, m i ). Hence for i = i * , we can generate the signature (s i , y i ) without explicitly knowing the secret key x, but instead using the right-hand side of (10) for computing y i . Obviously, this change in computing signatures is only conceptual, and so
Observe that i * is still independent of the adversary's view. Hence,
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abort bad.s if the adversary returns an s ∈ E * , i.e., the adversary returns a forgery attempt (s, y) with s = s i for some i, but s = s i * . Since i * is independent from the adversary's view, we have Pr[abort bad.s ] ≤ 1 − 1/q for any choice of the s i , so we get 
Note that in Game 6, the experiment never really uses secret key x to generate signatures: to generate the y i for s i = s i * , we already use (10), which requires no x. But if abort bad.a does not occur, then a m i = 0 whenever s i = s i * , so we can also use (10) to sign without knowing x. On the other hand, if abort bad.a does occur, we must abort anyway, so actually no signature is required. This means that Game 6 does not use knowledge about the secret key x. On the other hand, the adversary in Game 6 produces (whenever X 6 happens, which implies ¬abort bad.a and ¬abort bad.s ) during a forgery
From y and its knowledge about h and the s i , the experiment can derive
x+s .
Since gcd(η + s, p * (η)) = 1 (where we interpret η + s and p * (η) as polynomials in η), we can write p * (η)/(η + s) = p (η) + q 0 /(η + s) for some polynomial p (η) of degree at most q − 2 and some q 0 = 0. Again, we can compute g =g p (x) . We finally obtain
This means that the from the experiment performed in Game 6, we can construct an adversary A that (t , )-breaks the q-SDH assumption. A's running time t is approximately t plus a small number of exponentiations, and
A is successful whenever X 6 happens:
Putting (7-15) together yields Lemma 11.
Type II Forgers
Lemma 12. Let F 2 be a forger of type II that (t 2 , q, 2 )-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIG BM [H]. Then there exists an adversary A that (t , )-breaks the q-SDH assumption and an adversary A * that (t , )-breaks the discrete logarithm problem in G such that t , t ≈ t 2 and
Note that the discrete logarithm problem is at least as hard as the q-SDH problem, so for Theorem 10, we can assume ≥ without loss of generality.
For the proof, we again proceed in games. The proof is very similar to the proof for type I forgers, so we will be brief where similarities occur. 
Game 2. Now we select the used randomness s i used for answering signing queries at the beginning of the experiment and set E = q i=1 {s i }. We select the elements g, h passed to PHF. TrapGen(1 k , g, h) as follows: We uniformly choose a generatorg ∈ G. Define the polynomial p(η) = t∈E (η + t) and note that deg(p) ≤ q. Hence the values g =g p(x) and X = g x =g xp(x) can be computed fromg,g x , . . . ,g x q+1 . We choose c ∈ Z |G| uniformly and set
Note that we can compute (x + s i )th roots from g and h for all i. These change is purely conceptual:
Game 3. We answer all signature requests from the adversary as in Game 3 of the proof of Lemma 11. That is, we use the way that g and h are chosen to avoid having to compute the (x + s i )th root. This change is only conceptual, and we have
Game 4. We now abort and raise event abort log if a m + c · b m = 0 mod |G| for the adversary's forged message m. Since we chose c as a uniform exponent and only pass g and h = g c (but no further information about c) to adversary and PHF.TrapGen, these algorithms break a discrete logarithm problem. In particular, we can construct a suitable (t , )-attacker A * on the discrete logarithm problem in G that takes g c as input and computes c = −a m /b m mod |G|. This adversary achieves
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abort bad.a if a m (obtained from PHF.TrapEval(t, m)) is zero for the adversary's forgery message m. The programmability of H directly implies
Now from Game 5, we can now construct an adversary A on the (q + 1)-SDH assumption. A takes inputsg,g x , . . . ,g x q+1 and simulates Game 5 with adversary F 2 . A uses its inputs as if it was selected by the experiment; note that in Game 5, the secret key x is not used anymore. Now whenever Since we have a m + c · b m = 0 mod |G|, we can compute a nontrivial root of the challengeg. Therefore, from
one can computeg 1/(x+s) , like in the proof of Lemma 11. Putting (16-21) together (and using that δ ≤ 1) yields Lemma 12.
Generic Signatures from RSA
Construction
Let G = QR N be the group of quadratic residues modulo an RSA number N = P Q, where P and Q are safe primes. Let n = n(k) and η = η(k) be two polynomials. Let a group hash function H = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) with inputs from {0, 1} n and outputs from G be given. We are ready to define our generic RSA-based signature scheme
Key-Generation: Generate N = P Q for safe distinct primes P , Q ≥ 2 η+2 , such that H can be used for the group
the public verification key (N, K) and the secret signing key (P , Q).
Signing: To sign m ∈ {0, 1} n , pick a random η-bit prime e and compute y = H K (m) 1/e mod N. The eth root can be computed using P and Q. The signature is the tuple (e, y) ∈ {0, 1} η × Z N . Verification: To verify that (e, y) ∈ {0, 1} η × Z N is a correct signature on a given message m, check that e is odd and of length η, and that y e = H(m) mod N . It is not necessary to check specifically that e is a prime. 2 2 2η−1 . As explained in the introduction, for q = 2 30 and k = 80 bits we are now able to choose η ≈ 80 bit primes.
Proof of Theorem 13
We first state the following simple lemma due to [41] .
To prove this lemma one can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute integers f, g such that bf + ag = gcd(a, b). One can check thatx := x f z g satisfies the above equation. Now let F be the adversary against the signature scheme. Throughout this proof, we assume that H is a (m, 1, γ, δ) -programmable hash function. Furthermore, we fix some notation. Let m i the ith query to the signing oracle an (e i , y i ) denote the answer. Let m and (e, y) be the forgery output by the adversary. We introduce two types of forgers:
Type I: It always holds that e = e i for some i. Type II: It always holds that e = e i for all i.
By F 1 (resp., F 2 ) we denote the forger who runs F but then only outputs the forgery if it is of type I (resp., type II). We now show that both types of forgers can be reduced to the strong RSA problem. Theorem 13 then follows by a standard hybrid argument.
Similar to the q-SDH case, both reductions rely on the standard trick [28] that given an RSA instance N = pq andg ∈ QR N , one can efficiently compute g ∈ QR N , together with q random solved instances (g 1/e i , e i ), for random primes e i . A new instance of the form (g 1/e , e) for e ∈ {e 1 , . . . , e q }, however, can be used to break the strong RSA assumption. For Type II forgers this idea can be applied more or less directly. For Type I forgers it may happen that there is a m-collision in the simulated random primes, i.e., we have e = e i 1 = · · · e i m , and one has to use the properties of the (m, 1)-PHF to be able to simulate the maximal m signatures of the form (H(m i j ) 1/e , e), while using the forger's output H(m) 1/e to break the strong RSA assumption. 
Type I Forgers
To prove the lemma we proceed in games. 
Game 2. Now we select the used primes e i used for answering signing queries not upon each signing query, but at the beginning of the experiment. Since the e i were selected independently anyway, this change is only conceptual. Let E = q i=1 e i be the set of all e i , and let E i = E \ {i}. We also change the selection of the elements g, h used during (K , t) $ ← PHF. TrapGen(1 k , g, h) as follows. First, we uniformly choose i * ∈ [q] and generatorsg ∈ Z * N ,h ∈ QR N . We then set E * = E \ {e i * }, E * ,i = E * \ {e i }, and g =g 2 x∈E * x , h=h x∈E x .
Note that we can extract an e i th root for i = i * from g and for all i from h. Unless none of the e i divides |G|, the induced distribution on g and h is the same as in Game 1. Since |G| = |QR N | = P Q for primes P = (P − 1)/2 and Q = (Q − 1)/2, and we assumed that P , Q ≥ 2 η+2 , however, we see that e i does not divide |G| (for all i)
Game 3.
In this game, we change the way signature requests from the adversary are answered. First, observe that the way we modified the generation of g and h in Game 2 implies that for any i with e i = e i * , we see that y i can be written as Hence for i = i * , we can generate the signature (e i , y i ) without explicit exponent inversion, but instead using this alternative presentation of y i . Obviously, this change in computing signatures is only conceptual, and so
Observe that i * is still independent of the adversary's view. (i 1 , . . . , i m ) . For each tuple, the probability for e i 1 = · · · = e i m+1 is 1/P m , where P denotes the number of primes 9 of length η. Since P > 2 η /3(η + 1) log 2 (see, e.g., [63, Theorem 5.7] ), a union bound shows that an (m + 1)-wise collision occurs with probability at most
Hence,
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abort bad.e if the adversary returns an e ∈ E * , i.e., the adversary returns a forgery attempt (e, y) with e = e i for some i, but e = e i * . Since i * is independent from the adversary's view, we have Pr[abort bad.e ] ≤ 1 − 1/q for any choice of the e i , so we get
Game 6. We now abort and raise event abort bad.a if there is an index i with e i = e i * but a m i = 0, or if a m = 0 for the adversary's forgery message. In other words, we raise abort bad.a iff we do not have a m i = 0 for all i with e i = e i * and a m = 0. Since we have limited the number of such i to m in Game 4, we can use the programmability of H. We hence have Pr[abort bad.a ] ≤ 1 − δ for any choice of the m i and e i , so we get
Note that in Game 6, the experiment never really needs to invert exponents to generate signatures: to generate the y i for e i = e i * , we already use the method of Game 3, which requires no inversion. But if abort bad.a does not occur, then a m i = 0 whenever e i = e i * , so we can also use that method to sign without inversion. On the other hand, if abort bad.a does occur, we must abort anyway, so actually no signature is required. This means that Game 6 does not use knowledge about the factorization of N . On the other hand, the adversary in Game 6 produces (whenever X 6 happens, which implies ¬abort bad.a and ¬abort bad.e ) during a forgery
From y and its knowledge abouth, and the e i , the experiment can derive
We have gcd(2a m x∈E * x, e) = 1 because e is larger than |a m | by H's boundedness, so that Lemma 14 finally allows to obtain y =g 1/e . Sinceg was chosen initially independently and uniformly from Z * N , this means that the from the experiment performed in Game 6, we can construct an adversary A that (t , )-breaks the strong RSA assumption. A's running time t is approximately t plus a small number of exponentiations, and A is successful whenever X 6 happens:
Putting (22-29) together yields Lemma 15. 
Again we proceed in games. The proof is very similar to the proof for type I forgers, so we will be brief where similarities occur.
Game 0. Let F 2 be a type II forger that (t 2 , q, 2 )-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIG RSA [H] . By definition, we have
Game 1. We now use the trapdoor key generation (K , t)
for uniformly selected generators g, h ∈ QR N to generate a H-key for public verification key of SIG RSA [H]. By the programmability of H,
Game 2. Now we select the used primes e i used for answering signing queries at the beginning of the experiment and set E = q i=1 e i . We select the elements g, h passed to PHF. TrapGen(1 k , g, h) as follows: we chooseg ∈ Z * N and c ∈ Z N 2 uniformly and set
Note that we can extract an e i th root from g and h for all i. These change is purely conceptual:
Game 3. We answer all signature requests from the adversary as in Game 3 of the proof of Lemma 15. That is, we use the way that g and h are chosen to avoid having to invert exponents. This change is only conceptual, and we have
Game 4. We now abort and raise event abort bad.e if e divides a m + c · b m over the integers. Recall that |G| = |QR N | = p q for primes p , q with N = (2p + 1)(2q + 1).
Recall also that c is chosen uniformly from Z N 2 , so we can write c = c 1 + c 2 |G| with 0 ≤ c 1 < |G|. Note that c 2 is statistically 1/N -close to being uniformly distributed over {0, . . . ,
p q } and independent of c 1 . However, the only information about c released to the adversary and the PHF.TrapGen algorithm is h = g c and hence c 1 = c mod |G|.
We 
which occurs with probability at most 1/3 + 1/N due to the distribution of c 2 .
(Note that |G| = p q is invertible modulo e/d since |p |, |q | are prime and longer than e, and b m /d is invertible by construction of d.) We get
Now from Game 5, we can now construct an adversary A on the strong RSA assumption. A takes inputs N andg ∈ Z * N and simulates Game 5 with adversary F 2 . A uses g as well as N just as if it was selected by the experiment; note that in Game 5, no inversion of exponents is necessary anymore. Now whenever F 2 outputs a forgery, this implies in particular that no abort bad.e event was raised and we have
so that we can use Lemma 14 to computeg e/f from every successful forgery
Hence we can compute a nontrivial root of the challengeg and thus break the strong RSA assumption:
Putting (30-36) together yields Lemma 16 and completes the proof of Theorem 13.
Signature Sizes
In this section we compute the concrete size of our bilinear maps signatures Here we only focus on signature sizes. Let us stress again that the key sizes of our signature schemes are considerably larger compared to other schemes.
Concrete Security
This subsection follows the concrete security approach by Bellare and Ristenpart [4] , which in turn builds upon the concrete success measure from [42] .
For any adversary A running in time T(A) and gaining advantage we define the success ratio of A to be SR(A) := /T(A). The ratio of A's advantage to its running time provides a measure of the efficiency of the adversary. Generally speaking, to resist an adversary with success ration SR(A), a scheme should choose its security parameter (bits of security) such that SR(A) ≤ 2 −k (with respect to the best known attack).
Security of the q-DH Assumption
We consider Cheon's attacks against the q-DH assumption [25] over groups of prime order p. The main result of [25] is that there exists an adversary P such that
For our analysis we make the assumption that √ q/p is the maximal success ratio of an adversary against the q-DH problem, i.e., that
for all possible adversaries B. (We note that SR(P) = Θ( √ q/p) matches the generic lower bounds from [11] .)
Our Signature Scheme SIG BM [H] For our setting, we consider an uf-cma adversary A against the signature scheme SIG BM [H] that makes q signing queries, runs in time T(A), and has advantage . We can relate the success ratio of A to the success ration of the adversary B against the q-DH problem from our reduction. Namely, applying Theorem 10 we have
We want that the signature scheme has k bit security, i.e., that SR(A) ≤ 2 −k . Combining this with (37) and (38) we obtain
(To simplify the upcoming equations we only opt for k − 1 bit security.) We are interested in the minimal choice of the group order p and the (bit-)length η of the randomness such that the above equation holds. Clearly, (39) is satisfied if both,
and log p ≥ 2k + 3 log q − 2 log δ
hold.
The Signature Scheme by Boneh and Boyen The security reduction for Boneh/Boyen signatures to the q-DH assumption is tight, i.e., SR(A) ≈ SR(B) ≤ √ p/q which, for k bit security, again has to be bounded by 2 −k . Therefore we need to chose p such that log p ≥ 2k + 2 log q.
Note the size of the randomness η in the Boneh/Boyen signatures is always fixed, i.e., η = log p.
Concrete Comparison
We make a comparison for k = 80 bits. For concreteness we consider the instantiation SIG BM [H MG ] for the hash function H MG from Definition 3. By Theorem 5 this is a the (2, 1)-PHF with δ = 1 c ≈ 2 −3 log k and γ = 0. We will perform two types of comparisons.
Ignoring Increase of the Group First, as is common in the literature [11, 28, 33] , we ignore the penalty imposed on the group size due to the non-tight reduction and Cheon's attack. That is, ignoring (41) and (42) we always chose log p = 2k bits, independent of the number of signature queries an adversary can make. This is reasonable when one views a security reduction as an asymptotic indicator of security. However, the bound from (40) on the randomness η cannot be ignored since, as shown in the introduction, this may lead to an actual attack on the signature scheme. The signatures of SIG BM [H] consist of one group element plus η bit randomness, the signatures of SIG BB of one group element plus randomness which consists of one element from Z p . On special Bilinear Maps with the representation of one element in |G| takes exactly log p = 2k bits [11] , we obtain
For different choices of k and q the resulting signature sizes are given in the top two rows of Table 2 . For example, for k = 80 bits security, it seems realistic to assume that an adversary makes maximal q ∈ {2 20 , 2 30 , 2 40 } signature queries. Taking the Increase of the Group Into Account We now compute the signature sizes when also taking the increase of the underlying group size into account. Using (41) and (40) (42) for SIG BB we obtain
For different choices of k and q the signature sizes are given in the bottom two rows of Table 2 .
Online/Offline Signature Generation We mention, however, that the Boneh-Boyen signature has an interesting online/offline property. Namely, almost all of the computational work of signing can be outsourced into a precomputation phase. Later, when the messages to be signed are known, using the precomputation results, signatures can be prepared extremely efficiently. Our scheme SIG BM [H] does not seem to inherit this property.
The first theorem summarizes some elementary facts about one-dimensional random walks:
Theorem 17 (Random walks with {−1, 1}-steps). Let μ ∈ N >0 and a 1 , . . . , a μ ∈ {−1, 1} be independently and uniformly distributed random variables. For i ∈ Z, let
where the probability is over the a i . Then 
To see the upper bound in (A.5), we may assume i ≥ 0 because of (A.2). Note that
where ( 
as desired, where ( * ) denotes again Stirling's approximation.
However, for our purposes, it is more useful to allow zero-steps, since this avoids (A.1).
Theorem 18 (Random walks with {−1, 0, 1}-steps). Let μ ∈ N >0 and a 1 , . . . , a μ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be independently and uniformly distributed random variables. For i ∈ Z, let
where the probability is over the a i . Then
Furthermore, there exists Λ > 0 and, for every c > 0, also λ c > 0, such that for all i with |i| ≤ c √ μ, 
This shows (A.7) for μ + 1, and hence in general. Next, we prove the upper bound in (A.8). To this end, let n 0 := |{j | a j = 0}| be the number of zeros among the a j . Clearly, the expectation value of n 0 is μ/3. Hence, using Hoeffding's inequality, we first obtain
This provides an upper bound Λ on p μ (i)/ √ μ. To derive a lower bound, assume a fixed c > 0, and write m := 2 c √ μ/2 (i.e., m is the smallest even upper bound on c √ μ). We get
, so that we can use (A.5).
Finally, (A.9) and (A.10) are immediate consequences of (A.8).
We establish a small piece of notation: for a 1 , . . . , a μ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and X ⊆ [μ], we abbreviate i∈X a i with a(X). The following lemma is the "non-splitting" argument already mentioned in the informal proof of Theorem 5. N >0 and a 1 , . . . , a μ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be independently and uniformly distributed random variables. Let ∅ R S ⊂ [μ]. Let c > 0 and t ∈ Z with |t| ≤ c √ |S| be arbitrary. Then
Lemma 19. Let μ ∈
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume t ≥ 0; the case t < 0 is symmetric. Fix a value i * for i that maximizes the probability in (A.12). We first claim that we can assume 0 ≤ i * ≤ t without loss of generality. To see this, consider
by (A.7), so we can set i * = 0 as a value that maximizes (A.13).
, so we can use i * = t instead. Hence, we can assume 0 ≤ i * ≤ t. In fact, we may assume that
Namely, if neither (a) nor (b) were satisfied, we would have the contradiction
Furthermore,
either trivially by (A.7) (in case i * < t, and using that λ 1 ≤ Λ), or by (A.9) (in case i * = t, and using that then |t − i * |, |t .14) and (A.15) yields . We obtain
and
where ( * ) uses that E is independent of a(Δ X ). Combining (A.17) and (A.18) gives
where
and we obtain 
Lemma 21. In the situation of Lemma 20, let additionally
, and hence
Here, ( * ) uses the fact that G and a j are independent. Since 0 < λ c ≤ Λ for all c, we have 2/3 ≥ 1/2 ≥ 
(A.23) where the probability is over the trapdoor t that was produced along with K . Here X i may depend on all X j and r X j for j < i, and the Z 1 , . . . , Z n may depend on all X i and r X i .
If γ is negligible and δ is noticeable, we simply call RH (m, n)-programmable.
We remark that RPHFs are a strict generalization of PHFs from Sect. 3. Furthermore, it can be verified that our two applications of PHFs from Sect. 4 can also be securely instantiated with RPHFs.
B.2. Construction
In the following we denote [x] 2 := x mod 2 . The first randomized programmable hash function is variant of a hash function implicitly used in a construction by Fischlin [33] . Again, the above theorem also generalizes to groups of unknown order.
Theorem 26.
For the group G = QR N of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and q, the function RH F is a 2 -bounded (1, 1, 3/N, 1/2)-programmable randomized hash function. Now if we just write things differently, we obtain the RPHF that was (implicitly) used in Okamoto's scheme from [57] . In particular, Okamoto's scheme can be explained as our bilinear signature scheme SIG BM [RH], instantiated with a suitable RPHF RH L over a cyclic group. Formally: Definition 27. Let G = (G k ) be a group family, where G k is of order p k . We define RH L = (RPHF.Gen, RPHF.Eval) as the following group hash function with randomness space R = Z p(k) :
-RPHF.Gen(1 k ) returns a uniformly and independently sampled K = (h 0 , h 1 , h 2 ) ∈ G 3 .
-RPHF.Eval(K, X; r) Again, the theorem also generalizes to groups |G| of unknown order where we have to statistically approximate the group order. In fact, we can even work with a significantly shorter randomness space: We can prove Theorem 29 using a trapdoor key setup similar to the one for the case of a known group order. Concretely, RPHF.TrapGen(1 k , g, h) tosses a random coin Δ ∈ {0, 1} and sets up
With this setup, we get in particular a X (r) = r + ΔX − r 1 . Hence, trapdoor randomness generation returns r 1 − ΔX. Because r 1 ∈ {0, 1} L for L = + k and X ∈ {0, 1} , this randomness value r 1 − ΔX is statistically close to uniform even for Δ = 1. In this way, we can explain the (implicit) RPHFs from the signature schemes of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [21] (with L = +k +log 2 N ) and a variant of Zhu [67] (with slightly larger randomness space L = + k). Observe, however, that these constructions are not suitably bounded to achieve short signature schemes through Theorem 13. Recall that Theorem 13 assumed bounded RPHFs to ensure that certain exponents are coprime (so Lemma 14 can be used to extract a nontrivial root). In the schemes [21, 67] , a more direct investigation shows that even with the used (not suitably bounded) RPHFs, this coprimality holds with large probability.
We finally note that it is possible to generalize RH F , resp. RH L to an (m, 1)-RPHF. However, also this generalization is not sufficiently bounded in order to be useful to our applications of short signatures (cf. also Footnote 4).
